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INTRODUCTION
The government of Sudan is nearing completion of the Merowe
Dam, a large hydroelectric dam north of Khartoum, Sudan’s capital. 1
Reports differ, but at the Dam’s completion, the reservoir behind it
will stretch to approximately 175 kilometers in length. 2 To
accommodate the vast size of the reservoir, the government of Sudan
is displacing approximately 60,000 people. 3 As most are not leaving
Sudan, they will join the ranks of the world’s twenty-four million
internally displaced persons (“IDPs”). 4 A U.N. Special Rapporteur to
1. See Advocacy Group Calls to Suspend Merowe Dam Construction, SUDAN
TRIB., Mar. 23, 2006, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article14670
[hereinafter Suspend Merowe Dam Construction] (observing that the Dam is the
largest hydroelectric project being built in Africa today); Simon Apiku, New Dam
to Power Sudan from Next Year, REUTERS, Aug. 15, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSMCD541789 (reporting that two
of the of Dam’s ten turbine units will be online in 2008 for a total production of
250 megawatts of electricity, and the other eight will be operational by the end of
2009).
2. Compare Suspend Merowe Dam Construction, supra note 1 (stating that
the reservoir will extend 200 kilometers), with PETER BOSSHARD & NICHOLAS
HILDYARD, INT’L RIVERS NETWORK, A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR PEACE,
DEMOCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SUDAN AND THE MEROWE/HAMADAB DAM
PROJECT: REPORT FROM A VISIT TO SUDAN AND A FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE
MEROWE DAM PROJECT § 3 (2005), http://internationalrivers.org/files/050428
merowe.pdf [hereinafter FACT-FINDING MISSION] (estimating that the reservoir
will extend 174 kilometers).
3. See Press Release, United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
[UNHCHR], U.N. Expert Urges Sudan to Respect Human Rights of Communities
Affected by Hydro-Electric Dam Projects (Aug. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/E8A869684389FFA0C12573
44005DD01D?opendocument [hereinafter UNHCHR Press Release] (noting that
women, children, and the elderly are among the over 60,000 people whom the
project will displace); see also FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (stating
that the project will displace 9,500 families, for an estimated total of 50,000
people); Edmund Sanders, The World: Fears of Another Darfur: As Tensions Flare
over Proposed Dams, Many Predict Sudan's Nubia Region Will Be the Next to
Erupt in Violence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at A1 (predicting that the waters
will displace 70,000 people).
4. See INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE & NORWEGIAN
REFUGEE COUNCIL, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 2006 6 (Anne Glusker ed., 2007), available at
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/925151
0E3E5B6FC3C12572BF0029C267/$file/Global_Overview_2006.pdf [hereinafter
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT] (listing statistics on IDPs and indicating that Africa is
the most affected continent); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
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Sudan has called for work on the Dam to stop until the government
of Sudan guarantees the safety of those affected. 5
This Comment explores the actions of Sudan’s government as it
displaces its citizens to complete the Merowe Dam project. Part II
provides background information on IDPs and Sudan’s experience
with IDPs. 6 Part II also introduces the relevant instruments of
international law addressing IDPs, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 7 the International
Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), 8
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“Guiding
Principles”), 9 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”). 10 Finally, Part II discusses the Merowe Dam project
and the flaws in its implementation. 11 Part III argues that Sudan is
violating, among other things, provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR
as well as the Guiding Principles. 12 Part III also argues that
Comm’n on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Report
of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted
Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39, Intro., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (prepared by Francis M. Deng)
[hereinafter Guiding Principles] (defining internally displaced persons as “persons
or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their
homes or places of habitual residence . . . and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border”).
5. See UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 3 (urging the government of
Sudan to adhere to accepted international standards in carrying out the Merowe
Dam project, encouraging nations funding the project to ensure that the project
does not violate human rights, imploring the companies involved in the
construction of the dam to stop their work until the project’s impact on human
rights can be examined, and calling for an independent review by U.N. human
rights monitors).
6. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the criteria for labeling people as
IDPs and describing Sudan’s extensive IDP problem).
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
8. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
9. Guiding Principles, supra note 4.
10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
11. See discussion infra Part II (presenting benefits of the Dam such as
increased availability of electrical power in Sudan and the problems the Dam and
its implementation present such as dangerous downstream water level variance).
12. See discussion infra Part III (specifying provisions of the Guiding
Principles such as the right to choose one’s place of residence and the right to an
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Principle 6(2)(c) of the Guiding Principles is too vague and that the
principle does not provide enough guidance for evaluating large
development projects as a legitimate source of displacement. 13 Part
III concludes by arguing that Article 7 of the Rome Statute gives the
ICC the power to prosecute those responsible for the displacements
in Sudan. 14
Part IV recommends the establishment of a framework of
regulations for Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) that elucidate the
requirements for a justified forced relocation for a development
project. 15 Part IV also recommends that Sudan adhere to international
law as it undertakes the Merowe Dam project. 16 Part IV concludes by
advocating prosecution of those who are responsible for the
displacements under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 17

I. BACKGROUND
IDPs are a worldwide problem. 18 The Guiding Principles
recognize IDPs as a population distinct from traditional refugees and
seek to apply some of the protections of international instruments to
IDPs. 19 When large development projects cause internal
adequate standard of living).
13. See discussion infra Part III (exploring the ambiguity of Principle 6(2)(c)’s
proportionality test, which weighs the aggregate benefits of the project against the
injury to those the project will displace).
14. See discussion infra Part III (detailing the procedure for U.N. Security
Council review of a suspected human rights abuse and eventual referral to the U.N.
Special Prosecutor in the event of such abuse).
15. See discussion infra Part IV (recommending that the Guiding Principles
require that those displaced by large development projects benefit directly from the
project that displaced them).
16. See discussion infra Part IV (urging Sudan to provide IDPs with an
adequate standard of living).
17. See discussion infra Part IV (challenging the ICC’s propensity to refuse to
admit internal displacement cases).
18. See Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, Introduction, in THE FORSAKEN
PEOPLE: CASE STUDIES OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED 1, 1 (Roberta Cohen &
Francis M. Deng eds., 1998) (recognizing that the number of nations affected by
IDPs grew from eleven in 1982 to thirty-five in 1997); see also INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 4, at 6 (reporting that by 2006, IDPs affected fifty-two
countries).
19. See Bill Frelick, Aliens in Their Own Land: Protection and Durable
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, in WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998 30,
32 (1998) (reflecting on the Guiding Principles’ definition of IDPs and focus on
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displacement, the Guiding Principles present a proportionality test
for determining the acceptability of the displacements. 20 As a large
development project, such a test applies to the Merowe Dam
project. 21 Forced displacement without adequate justification can
constitute a crime against humanity, which allows the ICC to
prosecute those responsible. 22

A. IDPS AND SUDAN’S ONGOING PROBLEMS WITH IDPS
Historically, international instruments have not adequately
protected IDPs, and this remains true today. 23 In the absence of
binding law to specifically protect IDPs, national and international
bodies have had difficulty determining which human rights
guarantees apply to IDPs and how to apply them effectively. 24
protection of those displaced as opposed to the location of those displaced in order
to best provide for IDPs).
20. See WALTER KÄLIN, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: ANNOTATIONS 17 (2000) (positing that for a large
development project causing displacement to proceed, Guiding Principle 6(2)(c)
provides that the project must meet the “requirements of necessity and
proportionality” to show “compelling or overriding public interests”); see also
WORLD BANk, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL: OPERATIONAL
POLICIES: INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT para. 2(a) (2001), available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/toc2/CA2D01
A4D1BDF58085256B19008197F6?OpenDocument
[hereinafter
OP 4.12]
(clarifying the World Bank’s policy on involuntary resettlement by permitting
development projects provided that all viable alternatives are explored in the
interest of avoiding displacement).
21. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (outlining the benefits of the Merowe Dam
project weighing against the harm of the displacements the project is causing); see
also SUDAN TRIBUNE, supra note 1 (addressing the far-reaching impact of the
Merowe Dam project, the largest hydroelectric dam project underway in Africa, on
the environment of Sudan).
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d) (listing forcible transfer of
population as a crime against humanity prosecuted by the ICC).
23. See THOMAS G. WEISS & DAVID A. KORN, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT:
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, at xvii (Routledge 2006)
(describing present efforts within the U.N. to protect IDPs as “frustratingly
inadequate”); see also Cohen & Deng, supra note 18, at 1-2 (recognizing the lack
of a protection mechanism for IDPs despite the global impact of internal
displacement).
24. See ROBERTA COHEN & FRANCIS M. DENG, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE
GLOBAL CRISIS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 74 (1998) [hereinafter MASSES IN
FLIGHT] (noting that “internally displaced persons do not forfeit their inherent
rights because they are displaced,” but the method for protecting these inherent
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Existing instruments of international law continue to protect IDPs. 25
Such international instruments must compete with state
sovereignty—the concept that an international body should not
regulate activities taking place within a state’s borders. 26 However,
this attitude is beginning to change, with the concept of sovereignty
impressing upon nations a responsibility to respect their citizens.27
An instance in which a state cannot or will not respect the human
rights of its citizens raises the possibility that the international
community will intervene. 28 In cases involving IDPs, this is often
necessary because relying on the government that displaced the IDPs
to protect them is impracticable. 29 As a response to abuse of

rights has proven elusive).
25. See generally id. at 73-122 (providing an overview of the framework for
protection of IDPs which includes such documents as the ICCPR, ICESCR, the
Geneva Convention of 1949, and the International Labor Organization
Conventions).
26. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (acknowledging the importance of
sovereignty by stating that “the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members” is the foundation of the United Nations); see also WEISS & KORN, supra
note 23, at 5 (admitting that nations have viewed sovereignty as a pretense for
acting with impunity with respect to their citizens).
27. See WEISS & KORN, supra note 23, at 3 (distilling the concept of sovereign
responsibility into two component parts: the responsibility of states to protect their
citizens’ human rights and an international responsibility to intervene when states
fail to do so); see also Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a
Right of Humanitarian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 21, 42 (Gene M. Lyons &
Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) (arguing that there is a right to state intervention
“when such interventions are based on the institution of the protection of nationals,
or on the measures taken under Chapter VII of the [U.N.] Charter”).
28. See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council, Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General,
¶ 569, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Darfur Inquiry] (imploring
the international community to act when Sudan did not act to stop the atrocities in
Darfur); see also CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 214 (2004) (insisting that protection of
individual human rights is now an international concern); Jeff Nicolai, Comment,
Operation Murambatsvina: A Crime Against Humanity Under the Rome Statute?,
21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 813, 835 (2006) (referring to international protection of
citizens when sovereign governments fail to protect them as an “emerging
principle” of international law).
29. See, e.g., Luke T. Lee, Current Development, The London Declaration of
International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.
454, 457 (2001) (analogizing the situation of state governments protecting IDPs to
wolves guarding chicken coops).
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sovereignty, the international community has developed means of
prosecuting individuals who allegedly are responsible for causing
unlawful internal displacements. 30
Sudan has the highest population of IDPs in the world. 31 Sudan’s
nearly twenty-year civil war and ensuing humanitarian crises led to
many of the displacements. 32 Unlike these cases, the Merowe Dam
presents an unambiguous case of a government’s directly displacing
persons for a development project it has undertaken. 33

B. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND THE PRINCIPLE 6(2)(C)
PROPORTIONALITY TEST
The Guiding Principles provide protection for displaced persons
and seek to avoid displacement altogether.34 There are exceptions to
the Guiding Principles’ proscription of displacement, one of which
allows displacement resulting from large development projects if the
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (calling “deportation or forcible
transfer of population,” whether internal or international, a crime against humanity
falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court); cf. Nicolai,
supra note 28, at 816-17 (explaining that the ICC can still have jurisdiction over
countries not party to the Rome Statute if the U.N. Security Council “refers the
situation to [the] ICC prosecutor”).
31. See INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, supra note 4, at 6 (indicating Sudan’s
5,355,000 IDPs places it first globally in internal displacement).
32. See Marco Simons, The Emergence of a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced
Relocation, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 95, 108-09 (2002) (explaining that the
civil war is a result of tensions between an Islamic government and a non-Muslim
rebel army, and the displacements are the result of the elimination of squatters
around Khartoum and villages around oil fields). See generally Hiram A. Ruiz, The
Sudan: Cradle of Displacement, in THE FORSAKEN PEOPLE, supra note 18, at 139,
139-74 (recognizing that internal displacement has affected Sudan more heavily
than nearly all other nations in the twentieth century and describing the
geographical, racial, political, and economic geneses of the issue).
33. See Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project: Resettlement,
http://merowedam.gov.sd/en/social.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter
Resettlement] (discussing the relocation procedures Sudan proposes for those
displaced, indicating that the government is aware that the Merowe Dam project is
displacing people).
34. See generally Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement: A Few Comments on the Contribution of International
Humanitarian Law, 38 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 467, 467-80 (1998), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57jpg9 (recognizing that the
Guiding Principles’ emphasis on avoiding displacement altogether is a
reaffirmation of international humanitarian law concerning IDPs).
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projects provide sufficient benefits for the public.35 Therefore, the
displacements caused by the Merowe Dam project warrant an
analysis of the proposed benefits of the Dam under Guiding
Principle 6(2)(c). 36
1. The Guiding Principles Generally and Principle 6(2)(c)
Addressing Large Development Projects
The Guiding Principles address the proper treatment of IDPs in all
stages of displacement. 37 IDPs do not receive the same protections as
refugees, 38 but they are equally, if not more, in need of such
protections. 39 The purpose of the Guiding Principles is to clarify and
complete the protections that existing international instruments
provide. 40 This close relationship between the Guiding Principles and
35. See Simons, supra note 32, at 146 (assessing the legality of forced
relocation by positing that relocation must not be “based on an arbitrary purpose or
process,” but rather on a public purpose compelling enough to justify the
relocations); see also Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to be Displaced, 9 AM.
U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 689, 729 (1994) (intimating that the international
community views development-induced displacements differently than
displacements resulting from violence or other human rights violations).
36. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the potential benefits of the
Merowe Dam project to the Sudanese people).
37. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 2 (presenting the phases of internal
displacement as “protection against displacement; protection during displacement;
. . . [provision of] humanitarian assistance; and protection during return,
resettlement, and reintegration”).
38. See PHUONG, supra note 28, at 25 (proposing that legal protection of
refugees is a “surrogate protection,” in which the international community assumes
the responsibility for providing protection that would otherwise have been the
responsibility of the home state, whereas protection of IDPs is a “complementary
protection” that coexists with state protections, and contending that the
categorizations should remain distinct to avoid diluting existing refugee
protections); see also Francis M. Deng, Section Three: International Processes:
Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Protection, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 218 (2006) (noting that although the state is often the cause
of internal displacement, the international community considers protection of IDPs
to be the state’s responsibility).
39. See PHUONG, supra note 28, at 7 (noting that IDPs often live with poorer
conditions and higher death rates than refugees because they are frequently
inaccessible to aid agencies).
40. See id. at 58 (explaining that in addition to restating general norms of
protection, the Guiding Principles apply them specifically to IDPs); see also
KÄLIN, supra note 21, at v (stating that the Guiding Principles address “gray areas
and gaps” in existing international law).
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existing international law allows the Guiding Principles to serve an
indicative function 41 —when a party fails to respect the nonbinding
Guiding Principles, the party typically violates binding international
law as well. 42 Although the Guiding Principles are not binding
international law, both states and non-state actors widely respect
them. 43
Section One of Principle Six of the Guiding Principles proscribes
arbitrary displacement. 44 Section Two of Principle Six presents a
non-exhaustive list of situations in which the Guiding Principles
prohibit displacement, including large-scale development projects,
while still allowing some exceptions. 45 Read as a corollary, large
41. See Lavoyer, supra note 34, at 467-68 (explaining that the Guiding
Principles incorporate elements of “international humanitarian law, human rights
law, and refugee law,” suggesting that the Guiding Principles draw attention to the
synergies of these bodies of law with the protection of IDPs).
42. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 5 (cementing the close
relationship between the Guiding Principles and international law by requiring
conformity with the latter).
43. See, e.g., WEISS & KORN, supra note 23, at 109-10 (citing Liberia, Sri
Lanka, and Burundi, among others, as states that have issued policies and made
declarations based on the Guiding Principles); Francis M. Deng, International
Response to Internal Displacement: A Revolution in the Making, HUM. RTS. BRIEF,
Spring 2004, at 24, 25 (lauding the extension of the invocation of the Guiding
Principles’ application past states to non-state actors such as the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army, a rebel group that considered the Guiding Principles
in establishing its own rules on IDPs); Hanna Entwisle, Tracing Cascades: The
Normative Development of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 369, 370-71 (2005) (stating that the Guiding Principles have
become “surprisingly influential” in a short time span and underscoring the
significant international attention paid to “contravention” of the Guiding Principles
despite their nonbinding status); Pooja Mehta, Comment, Internally Displaced
Persons and the Sardar Sarovar Project: A Case for Rehabilitative Reform in
Rural India, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 613, 621-23 (2005) (recognizing the
emergence of a normative framework, outlined by the Guiding Principles, for
protection of IDPs as the result of the failure of the international community to
produce an agreement similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention).
44. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6 (“Every human being shall
have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her
home or place of habitual residence.”); see also KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 14
(noting that the Guiding Principles explicitly addressed arbitrary displacement,
which human rights law had failed to do).
45. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(2) (“The prohibition of
arbitrary displacement includes displacement: (a) When it is based on policies of
apartheid, ‘ethnic cleansing’ or similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering
the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population; (b) In
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development projects are an acceptable basis for displacement in a
case where a government can show great public need. 46 Walter
Kälin, the current Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on
the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, introduced a
proportionality test to determine if a development project is
acceptable under the Guiding Principles. 47 The third and final section
of Principle Six limits the duration of displacement—presenting
another element of the proportionality analysis. 48 However, this
provision may cause difficulty in instances where displaced persons
cannot return to their original place of residence. 49
2. Proposed Benefits Relevant for a Principle 6(2)(c)
Proportionality Analysis
According to the Sudanese government, the Merowe Dam project
proposes myriad benefits for Sudan and its citizens. 50 Foremost is the
Dam’s considerable power generating capability. 51 At full capacity,
situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand; (c) In cases of large-scale development
projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests;
(d) In cases of disasters, unless the safety and health of those affected requires their
evacuation; and (e) When it is used as a collective punishment.”).
46. See Interview by Debbie Elliot, Host, All Things Considered, with Miloon
Kothari, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Hous. (Sept. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14130080 [hereinafter NPR
Interview] (conceding that while often detrimental, large-scale development
projects may displace people if those displaced can “continue with their
livelihood”).
47. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 17 (positing that a state must prove the
“compelling and overriding public interests” required by the Guiding Principles to
meet the requirement of “necessity and proportionality”).
48. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(3) (“Displacement shall last
no longer than required by the circumstances.”).
49. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 19 (asserting that prolonged displacement
contradicts human rights norms and inhibits finding lasting solutions to questions
surrounding IDPs).
50. See Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project: About the Dam,
http://merowedam.gov.sd/en/location.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter
About the Dam] (indicating that the electrical power from the Dam will allow new
industrial projects, development of a fishing industry in the lake created by the
Dam, improved access to groundwater through use of electrical pumps, and a
higher standard of living for those around the lake).
51. See Dan Morrison, The Quest for Oil: China Invests while Sudan Wars in
Darfur, U.S. NEWS, July 29, 2007, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
news/articles/070729/6china.africab.htm (stating that, when fully operational, the
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the Dam will increase the available electrical supply of Sudan’s
power grid by 150%. 52 Sudan lags behind the rest of the world, even
the developing world, in availability of electricity, and the addition
of the Merowe Dam will allow for much greater electrification. 53
While the government of Sudan primarily cites electrical power as
the reason for constructing the Merowe Dam, the government also
proposes several other benefits, including flood control and irrigation
of the arid land around the Dam. 54 Floods are a major problem in
Sudan, 55 and in 2007, they affected half a million people in only
three months. 56 If the Dam works as planned for flood control, the
water level downstream from the Dam will continue to vary

Merowe Dam will produce 1,250 megawatts of electricity).
52. See Apiku, supra note 1 (determining that just the initial two turbines,
producing 250 megawatts, will immediately reduce some of the strain on Sudan’s
national power grid).
53. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 2 (revealing the degree to
which Sudan is in need of electricity by explaining that in a nation of nearly forty
million people, only 700,000 have electricity). Compare Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook: Sudan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) (indicating Sudan’s
energy consumption of 3.298 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) for a population of
40,218,455 yielding only approximately 82 kWh per capita), with Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Egypt, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2008)
(indicating Egypt’s consumption of 84.49 billion kWh for a population of
81,713,517, or approximately 1034 kWh per capita).
54. See About the Dam, supra note 51 (lauding the dam as a solution to
Sudan’s slow economic and social development).
55. See American Red Cross: American Red Cross Presents Its Most Recent
News and Research Developments, LIFE SCI. WKLY., Aug. 21, 2007, at 5945
(warning that seasonal flooding typical in Sudan during the summer could affect
up to 2.4 million people in 2007).
56. See Badru Mulumba, River Nile Could Displace One Million Sudanese,
NEW VISION (UGANDA), Aug. 19, 2007 (reporting that flooding destroyed 30,000
homes in Sudan and left an estimated 150,000 people homeless); FEWS South
Sudan Food Security Watch Dec 2007 - Flood Induced Crop Losses Threaten
Food Security, RELIEFWEB, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.
NSF/db900SID/EDIS-79TS27?OpenDocument (noting that floods impacted an
estimated 500,000 people between October and December 2007); FOOD AND
AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SUDAN: FLOODS FLASH APPEAL 2007
(2007), http://www.fao.org/emergencies/tce-appfund/tce-appeals/appeals/emergenc
y-detail0/en/?uidf=1426&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1077&tx_ttnews%5BbackP
id%5D=1388&cHash=a (proposing relief projects for Sudan following a season of
devastating flooding).
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radically. 57 These variations will be predictable, but may cause
problems. 58 The Sudanese government presents irrigation as another
benefit of the Dam, but experts are skeptical about the ability of the
Sudanese government to implement such a program. 59

C. THE BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ICCPR AND
ICESCR PROTECTS IDPS
Sudan is party to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both of which
historically have offered a limited degree of protection to IDPs. 60
The documents are entirely consistent with the Guiding Principles,
and although they are general in scope, they apply to IDPs. 61 Both
instruments contain guarantees of rights implicated in any situation
of displacement, such as an individual’s right to an adequate standard
of living and the sanctity of the family unit. 62 The ICCPR provides
that citizens shall have freedom of movement and choice of
57. See CRISTIAN TEODORU ET AL., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE MEROWE DAM PROJECT (NILE
RIVER, SUDAN) 7 (2006), available at http://www.eawag.ch/media/20060323/
Independent-Review-20060323-Short.pdf (warning that the operational cycle of
the Dam will create dangerous fluctuations in water levels downstream from the
Dam, an occurrence known as “hydropeaking,” which “will have detrimental
effects on aquatic ecosystems”).
58. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (noting the destructive effect
of fluctuating water levels on irrigation pumps downstream from the Dam, as well
as the danger to people working along the river).
59. See id. § 3 (noting the contradictory statements given by Sudanese
government officials as to whether the irrigation component of the Dam would
move forward).
60. See UNHCHR, Status By Country, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/new
hvstatusbycountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=250&Expand=165#165
(last
visited Aug. 19, 2008) (confirming that Sudan is a party to both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR, and both covenants entered into force on June 18, 1986); see also
discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text (explaining that protection for
IDPs has traditionally fallen under international instruments).
61. See generally MASSES IN FLIGHT, supra note 24 (providing an overview of
the Guiding Principles as they relate to the ICCPR and the ICESCR).
62. See ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 10, 11 (reaffirming the commitment of the
states party to the convention to the right to family and the right to an adequate
standard of living); ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 6, 7, 23, 26 (recognizing the
inherent right to life, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, and equality
before the law, and reaffirming that the family is the fundamental societal unit);
see also PHUONG, supra note 29, at 40 (maintaining that the first concern for IDPs
is their physical safety and right to life, but that all areas of life from basic
necessities to education or work are adversely affected).
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residence. 63 Furthermore, the ICESCR provides for the right to
education and the right to work. 64 The ICESCR and the ICCPR
permit limitations to these rights only in a very specific number of
situations. 65 The Guiding Principles echo many of these provisions. 66

D. THE ROME STATUTE ALLOWS FOR PROSECUTION IN AN
INTERNATIONAL FORUM OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOVEREIGN
VIOLATIONS OF BINDING HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
The Rome Statute established the ICC as a response to the
limitations of ad hoc tribunals used in the past. 67 The Rome Statute
prevents perpetrators of serious crimes, such as crimes against
humanity 68 or war crimes, 69 from taking refuge in their state’s refusal
to prosecute them. 70 Article 7 of the Rome Statute enumerates acts
that are crimes against humanity, 71 and Article 7(1)(d) specifically

63. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 12.
64. See ICESCR, supra note 9, arts. 6, 13.
65. See id. art. 4 (requiring that limitations to these rights be both compatible
with the rights and in the interest of the general welfare); ICCPR, supra note 7, art.
12 (permitting restrictions only to preserve public order, public morals, public
health, national security, or the rights of others).
66. Compare Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princs. 10-23, with ICESCR,
supra note 8, arts. 6-15, and ICCPR, supra note 7, arts. 6-27.
67. See Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in
Enforcing International Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 539, 540-41
(2007) (listing inadequacies and problems of ad-hoc tribunals such as the
involvement of only a few states in their creation, their limiting geographic
specificity, dependence on the international attitudes toward their creation, and the
extensive delays and costs associated with their creation).
68. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity
as one of a number of acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population”).
69. See id. art. 8 (setting forth the definition of war crime and an extensive list
of war crimes, including directing military attacks against non-combatants).
70. See id. art. 4 (circumventing a state’s potential refusal to prosecute a
criminal by defining the International Criminal Court’s scope of powers to include
functioning on the territory of any State Party and, “by special agreement, on the
territory of any other State”); see also Kirsch, supra note 68, at 540-41 (illustrating
the problem of dependence on national courts to prosecute perpetrators of serious
crimes when such crimes generally made the state’s judicial system the least
willing or able to carry out such prosecution, often because the government itself
was a party to the crimes, as in the cases of Rwanda and Cambodia).
71. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (listing, inter alia, murder,
enslavement and torture as crimes against humanity).
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names forcible transfer of a population as such a crime. 72 Article
7(2)(d) elaborates on the meaning of “deportation or forcible
transfer,” specifying that the perpetrator must force the displaced
persons from a place where they are lawfully present, and the
displacement must violate international law. 73 The Rome Statute
deems an act a “crime against humanity” only if the act passes a high
threshold. 74 The statute requires that any of the acts it lists as crimes
against humanity be committed in “a widespread or systematic
attack” 75 and that those committing the act have knowledge of it. 76
Article 13 of the Rome Statute gives jurisdiction over crimes
committed by states not a party to the Statute. 77 The U.N. Security
Council may refer a situation in a non-member state to the ICC
pursuant to the Council’s Chapter VII powers. 78 The ICC requires
such a referral because its jurisdiction is not universal. 79 The ICC
72. Id. art. 7(1)(d).
73. Id. art. 7(2)(d).
74. See Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 47 (1999) (observing that participants in the
Rome Conference agreed that a strict standard for defining a crime against
humanity was needed to prevent all inhumane acts from being considered “crimes
against humanity”).
75. See Sylvia de Bertodano, Current Developments in Internationalized
Courts: East Timor – Justice Denied, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 910, 919 (2004)
(reiterating the importance of the “widespread and systematic” element as a
requirement for an act to rise to the level of a crime against humanity in the context
of the ethnic conflict in East Timor).
76. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1) (requiring that the perpetrator of
an act constituting a crime against humanity have knowledge of the act); see also
YOUNG SOK KIM, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY OF THE
ROME STATUTE 82 (2003) (clarifying that the term “knowledge” as used in the
Rome Statue does not require proof that the perpetrator knew exactly what was
occurring or specifically what the state policy was with respect to the act, but only
that the perpetrator had knowledge of the act’s occurrence).
77. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 13.
78. See Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Referral by States Parties, in THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 619,
619-20 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter ROME STATUTE
COMMENTARY] (discussing the ICC’s realization that unforeseen situations would
confront it and its subsequent development of “trigger mechanisms” for
jurisdiction, including the Security Council referral process).
79. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 61 (2001) (acknowledging two main objections to a court with
universal jurisdiction: first, the potential that the ambitious nature of such a court
would discourage its ratification, and second, the lack of legal rationale for a court
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exercises complementary jurisdiction and will act only when the
domestic courts of a country cannot or will not try those accused of
committing a crime. 80 Furthermore, in addition to the complementary
aspect of the court’s jurisdiction, the concept of admissibility means
that the ICC need not try every case over which it has jurisdiction,
but only those it chooses to try. 81

II. ANALYSIS
Sudan is violating provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR and
is implicating the Guiding Principles in the way it is undertaking the
Merowe Dam project. 82 Under Guiding Principle 6(2)(c)’s
proportionality analysis, the project causes impermissible hardship
for the IDPs. 83 If Sudan does not strive to meet the standards set by
the international instruments, the U.N. Security Council should refer
the case to the ICC because the displacements constitute a crime
against humanity, and Sudan is unable or unwilling to prosecute
those responsible. 84
with universal jurisdiction).
80. See John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in
ROME STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 78, at 667, 672-73 (stressing that states
heavily favored complementarity over concurrent jurisdiction when establishing
the ICC); Kirsch, supra note 67, at 543-44 (stressing that under the principle of
complementarity, the ICC will not act until all domestic options have been
exhausted, unless the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute). But see SCHABAS,
supra note 79, at 67 (referring to the term complementarity as a “misnomer”
because the ICC and national justice systems often work in opposition to one
another).
81. Cf. SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 69-70 (discussing non-discretionary
instances when the ICC cannot adjudicate cases, such as pardons or cases that have
already gone before domestic courts); Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the
Prosecutor, in ROME STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 78, at 1137, 1153
(observing that even where the issue is entirely discretionary, the prosecutor still
must take the factors of the situation into account to avoid acting arbitrarily).
82. See discussion infra Part III.B (elucidating Sudan’s specific transgressions
with respect to the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Guiding Principles).
83. See, e.g., KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 18 (detailing the ways in which the
proportionality test has been incorporated into the internal rules of international
organizations such as the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, including the requirement that alternatives to
displacement receive careful consideration); see also discussion infra Part III.A
(invoking the proportionality test when assessing the Merowe Dam project’s
displacements).
84. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, FACT
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A. THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF GUIDING PRINCIPLE 6(2)(C)
PRESENTS A LOOSELY-DEFINED PROPORTIONALITY TEST THAT
COULD ALLOW THE MEROWE DAM PROJECT TO CONTINUE
DESPITE LONG-TERM NET DETRIMENT TO THOSE THE PROJECT
DISPLACES
Principle 6(2)(c) allows projects such as the Merowe Dam if they
serve “compelling and overriding public interests.” 85 Sudan’s need
for electricity, which the government uses as the main justification
for constructing the Dam, is legitimate. 86 This is particularly relevant
because Sudan currently is proposing several more hydroelectrical
projects. 87 Sudan can justify construction of more dams, which are
notorious for displacing large numbers of people, 88 by claiming the
dams fulfill an essential need for the state and promote a higher
standard of living for the displaced. 89
Evaluating the Merowe Dam situation under Principle 6(2)(c)
requires a proportionality test that takes into account the overall
benefits of the project and the detriment to those the project

SHEET: THE SITUATION IN DARFUR, THE SUDAN paras. 1, 31 (2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP_Fact-Sheet-Darfur-20070227_
en.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (documenting the
referral of the Darfur situation in Sudan to the ICC because the domestic
authorities had failed to prosecute the crimes).
85. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 17 (conceding that large development projects
“can contribute significantly to the realization of human rights” and that relocation
is often necessary); see also NPR Interview, supra note 47 (recognizing that
evictions must sometimes happen in the course of large development projects).
86. See Apiku, supra note 1 (quoting Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir
as saying, “[T]he amount of power currently being generated meets only a fraction
of the requirements of the Sudanese people”); see also supra note 54 (calculating
the kilowatt-hours per capita in Sudan and neighboring Egypt, revealing Sudan’s
large relative power deficit).
87. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 2 (listing multiple planned
power projects, including the construction of a thirty megawatt facility at an
irrigation project and a fifty megawatt addition to an existing dam).
88. See, e.g., PHUONG, supra note 28, at 31 (estimating that the displacement
resulting from the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in China will reach
approximately 1.2 million people).
89. See Upendra Baxi, What Happens Next is up to You: Human Rights at Risk
in Dams and Development, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1507, 1509-10 (2001)
(paraphrasing a World Commission on Dams report that calls dams a “necessary
evil” and noting a general lack of parity in costs and benefits despite the positive
aspects of dam construction).
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displaces. 90 Applying a proportionality test leads to the conclusion
that the benefits the Merowe Dam creates do not justify the
difficulties the displaced persons encounter. 91 The irrigation
component of the project proposed by the government of Sudan may
not be feasible and will not operate efficiently if completed. 92 Flood
control is likely to be more effective but will still create hazardous
peaking downstream from the Dam. 93 The government of Sudan
presents an inadequate relocation and compensation scheme. 94
Providing the displaced farmers with monetary compensation is not
an adequate response. 95 The proportionality analysis requires that
90. See Anne Perrault et al., Partnerships for Success in Protected Areas: The
Public Interest and Local Community Rights to Prior Informed Consent (PIC), 19
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 498 (2007) (reviewing cases in the analogous area
of land-use rights of indigenous peoples and finding a need for proportionality
between the rights of those affected and the action taking place in order to classify
such an action as being in the “public interest”); see also OP 4.12, supra note 20,
para. 2(a) (outlining an implicit proportionality test in which a state must consider
“all viable alternative project designs” prior to proceeding with a project that will
require involuntary resettlement).
91. See Ali K. Askouri, The Merowe Dam: Controversy and Displacement in
Sudan, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Sept. 2004, at 56, 56-57, available at
http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR21/FMR21full.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2008) (denouncing the concealment of project plans, the failure of the authorities
to consider the views of those the project is displacing, and the human rights
abuses perpetrated against those protesting the project); TEODORU ET AL., supra
note 57, at 5-7 (finding numerous points of concern resulting from the Merowe
Dam project, among them sediment buildup in the Dam, which over time will
substantially reduce the reservoir’s capacity).
92. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 3; Adrian Laycock Limited,
Irrigation and Drainage, http://www.adrianlaycock.com/irrigate.htm (last visited
Aug. 19, 2008) (noting that the land surrounding the Dam is “extremely hostile” to
such an irrigation, placing “severe constraints” on the design of the irrigation
scheme). Adrian Laycock Limited is the irrigation design consultant for the
Merowe Dam project. Id.
93. See TEODORU ET AL., supra note 57, at 6-7 (recommending a secondary
dam to combat the harmful and dangerous effects of the daily peaking the Merowe
Dam will cause).
94. See Sudan Extends Merowe Dam Appeals Deadline to November, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 29, 2007 (bringing to light a delay in the
compensation scheme in which the government of Sudan put off the payment of
compensation and fulfillment of contracts by several weeks). See generally FACTFINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (delineating numerous social issues the
relocations are causing, such as replacing fertile farmland with arid, desert land).
95. See Mehta, supra note 49, at 640 (disapproving of cash payments as
compensation for lost land in cases of displacement of agrarian peoples as
removing the social and cultural foundations on which agrarian societies are built);

GROSS_PROOFED.DOC

2008]

12/4/2008 3:55:48 PM

IMPROVEMENT WITH IMPUNITY

395

those displaced enjoy a standard of living that is at least comparable
to, and preferably superior to, the standard they enjoyed prior to
displacement. 96 Sudan’s actions concerning the disbursements and
treatment of those displaced expose the inadequacies of the
compensation program. 97
The language of Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) suggests that it seeks to
prevent states from using development projects to justify human
rights violations. 98 Thus far, the government of Sudan does not
appear to have an ulterior motive of discrimination for the Merowe
Dam project. 99 In the absence of any such overtly negative
motivation, the international community must evaluate Sudan’s
actions using the proportionality test of Principle 6(2)(c). 100 Similar,
previous projects indicate that this analysis will likely conclude that
the Merowe Dam project fails to provide sufficiently for the
displaced. 101

see also Perrault et al., supra note 90, at 507 (encouraging alternate, non-monetary
forms of compensation when monetary compensation does not adequately address
the impact of displacement).
96. See, e.g., OP 4.12, supra note 20, paras. 2(c), 6(b)(ii), 6(c)(i) (requiring that
the state support those displaced by placing them in accommodations that, when all
factors are analyzed, provide for a standard of living that is at least as adequate as
that provided by their pre-displacement accommodations).
97. See Askouri, supra note 91, at 57 (decrying the Sudanese government’s use
of violence against farmers who attempted to return to their homes upon realizing
the inadequacy of the farm land in the relocation area).
98. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 17 (interpreting Guiding Principle 6(2)(c) as
asserting that development projects cannot be a disguise for discrimination).
99. See UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 3 (recognizing that the immediate
issues involving human rights protection arise from the implementation of the
Merowe Dam project and not from its development).
100. See Press Release, United Nations, As Mideast Fighting Rages, UN Rights
Experts Urge Parties to Protect Civilians (July 22, 2006), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=19279&Cr=Leban&Cr1= (reinforcing proportionality’s
role in situations where human rights law is implicated, including the protection of
displaced persons).
101. See WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW
FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 321 (2000), available at http://www.dams
.org/docs/report/wcdreport.pdf (deriding large scale displacements for dams as
having been a clear failure and recognizing the impact of large dams on human
development); see also Mehta, supra note 44, at 635-36 (attributing problems with
those displaced by dam construction in India to the failure of the Indian
government to provide an adequate legal framework to deal with such issues).
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B. THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN FAILED TO RESPECT THE
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND VIOLATED THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS
THAT FORM THE BASES OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN ITS
RELOCATION OF THE PEOPLE IN THE PATH OF THE RESERVOIR
Displacement unavoidably violates the rights of those displaced. 102
The government of Sudan violated the right guaranteed in the ICCPR
to choose one’s place of residence when it forcibly relocated those in
the way of the project without proper consultation. 103 The
government of Sudan violated the right of the IDPs to work, which
the ICESCR guarantees. 104 The ICESCR further guarantees an
adequate standard of living and access to an education, both of which
the government of Sudan has violated with the poorly planned and
executed displacements. 105
Besides Principle 6(2)(c) discussed above, Sudan failed to observe
other provisions of the Guiding Principles, beginning with an
obligation to prevent and avoid internal displacement. 106 The
102. See PHUONG, supra note 28, at 40 (recognizing that the emphasis in
displacement is typically on ensuring fundamental rights such as the right to life,
but noting that even when such fundamental rights are observed, being transient
interferes with rights arising from everyday activities, such as the right to work and
the right to education).
103. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 7(3)(d) (requiring an attempt to
include those the project will displace in decisions regarding their displacement);
see also ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 12 (granting those lawfully located within a
territory the right to choose their residence).
104. See ICESCR, supra note 8, art. 6 (protecting the right to work for all
people). But see Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse:
Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 363,
379 (2002) (construing the ICESCR’s right to work provision as requiring a state
party to the ICESCR to take steps to ensure the opportunity to work over time
rather than to provide an immediate right to work).
105. See ICESCR, supra note 8, arts. 11, 13 (providing for an adequate standard
of living, which includes food and housing, and the right to an education); see also
FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (linking an increase in disease in the
resettlement areas with the closely spaced resettlement housing lacking adequate
sanitation). Cf. Robert M. Cover, Obligation: Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social
Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65, 71 (1987) (contrasting the difficulty of applying an
affirmative right, such as the right to an education, with those rights which restrain
the government because affirmative rights require a party to provide the
guaranteed item).
106. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 5 (mandating adherence to
international law to prevent internal displacements).
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government of Sudan further failed to include those it displaced in
the displacement and resettlement process as Principle 7 of the
Guiding Principles requires. 107 This is relevant because while the
Guiding Principles are not binding, the ICCPR and ICESCR are
binding upon signatory nations. 108 The existing law of the ICCPR
and the ICESCR forms much of the basis for the Guiding
Principles. 109 Sudan is a party to both the ICESCR and the ICCPR,
and therefore Sudan is obligated to follow their provisions, and, by
extension, the coinciding portions of the Guiding Principles which
Sudan is violating. 110 If Sudan respects the Guiding Principles, the
indicative function of the Guiding Principles suggests that Sudan is
respecting binding international law as well. 111

107. See id. princ. 7(3)(d) (directing state agencies to attempt to include IDPs in
decisions concerning their displacement); see also KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 21
(underscoring that similar requirements of fairness toward the displaced exist in
other international instruments, such as International Labor Organization
Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples); Askouri, supra
note 91, at 56-57 (condemning the government of Sudan’s failure to consult the
displaced in the displacement and resettlement processes and its use of violence to
suppress dissenters). But see Resettlement, supra note 33 (presenting a framework
in which the government of Sudan purported to consult the displaced in
displacement and resettlement decisions).
108. See Entwisle, supra note 43, at 371 (establishing the Guiding Principles’
foundation in binding international law adapted to address issues of displacement);
see also DAVID A. KORN, EXODUS WITHIN BORDERS 90 (1999) (stressing that the
drafters of the Guiding Principles deliberately avoided proposing a legally binding
document to avoid the inevitable opposition and delay to the document’s release).
109. See THE OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
(OCHA), TRAINING ON THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
6 (Aug. 9-11, 2004), available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F0
04BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/139DAA0B7F0BB71680257091004B7656/$file/Puntlan
d_workshop_report_2004.pdf (recognizing that the Guiding Principles are based
on “international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee
law” as outlined in conventions and treaties).
110. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 13 (noting that situations causing
displacement are significantly less likely to occur if states respect international
law).
111. Id.; see also Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princs. 1, 2 (requiring
conformity with international law).
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C. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ICC COULD FIND THAT SUDAN’S
ACTIONS REACH THE LEVEL OF A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, THE
ICC IS UNLIKELY TO TRY SUDAN FOR COMMITTING A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY
By forcibly displacing people with the Merowe Dam project,
Sudan is committing actions that the ICC could find to meet the
requirements set forth by the Rome Statute for a crime against
humanity. 112 Similar situations in the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia indicate that a forcible transfer within a nation’s
borders provides grounds for finding commission of a crime against
humanity. 113 Although Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the
ICC can still obtain jurisdiction over the perpetrators of the Merowe
Dam displacements by a referral of the U.N. Security Council
pursuant to the Council’s Chapter VII powers. 114 It is unlikely,
however, that the ICC will prosecute members of the government of
Sudan for their actions in the Merowe Dam project.115 Although the
ICC is investigating the situation in Darfur, the Darfur situation is
distinguishable from the Merowe Dam displacements and does not
necessarily indicate that the ICC will pursue those responsible for the
Merowe displacements. 116
112. See Nicolai, supra note 28, at 815-17 (characterizing a comparable
displacement in Zimbabwe as a crime against humanity); see also Rome Statute,
supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d).
113. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 532,
533, 687-88 (Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/
judgement/krs-tj010802e.pdf (finding, under the ICTY statute, that forcible
internal transfers of Bosnian Muslims from an area of Bosnia and Herzegovina
constituted “inhumane treatment” that amounted to a crime against humanity).
114. See Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to
Prescribe in International Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 784-86 (2003)
(charging the U.N. Security Council with upholding “international peace and
security” through the exercise of its Chapter VII authority and the Rome Statute).
115. See Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 3-4
(Jan. 25, 2005), http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf [hereinafter
Inquiry on Darfur] (evaluating the list of crimes observed in Darfur before the ICC
admitted the situation).
116. Cf. Katy Glassborow, ICC Suspect Dealing with Darfur Crisis, INSTITUTE
FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, June 15, 2007, http://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=
f&o=336362&apc_state=henpacr (emphasizing the severity of the crimes for
which the ICC issued a warrant in the Darfur situation, including the coordination
of “murders, rapes, torture, forced displacement and unlawful imprisonment of
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1. Sudan’s Actions Constitute a Crime Against
Humanity under the Rome Statute
The forced displacements resulting from the Merowe Dam project
meet the threshold for a crime against humanity. 117 Without adequate
justification, Sudan forced the IDPs from homes in which they were
lawfully present, meeting the requirements set forth in Article 7(2)(d)
of the Rome Statute. 118 The government of Sudan has knowledge of
the displacements and is conducting them as part of a large scale
program, meeting the requirements set forth in Article 7(1),
applicable to all the named crimes against humanity.119 Furthermore,
Sudan is committing a crime against humanity even in the absence of
armed conflict, as international law bans crimes against humanity at
any time. 120

innocent civilians”).
117. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1) (listing forcible transfer of a
population, among other crimes, as a crime against humanity “when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack”); see also Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against
Humanity, in ROME STATUTE COMMENTARY, supra note 78, at 353, 360-65
(presenting the specific elements of mens rea and actus reus needed for crimes
against humanity under the Rome Statute).
118. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(d) (“‘Deportation or forcible
transfer of population’ means forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present,
without grounds permitted under international law . . . .”); see also KIM, supra note
76, at 563 n.223 (qualifying duress and coercion as meeting the requirement of
force as used in Article 7(2)(d) of the Rome Statute and emphasizing that overt
physical force is not a requirement of the article); Resettlement, supra note 34
(noting the government’s implicit acknowledgement of the legality of residence of
those the Dam will displace).
119. See Cassese, supra note 117, at 373-74 (recognizing the requirement in
customary international law and in the Rome Statue that the displacements or
crimes against humanity must be large scale).
120. See id. at 356 n.8 (listing sources confirming the lack of necessity for a
connection between war and crimes against humanity found in the dicta of a
decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and by
the International Committee of the Red Cross); see also SCHABAS, supra note 79,
at 22 (regarding the ability to try crimes against humanity during times of war or
peace as an example of the evolution of the definition of war crimes and crimes
against humanity).
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2. The ICC has Jurisdiction over Sudan Despite Sudan Not Being a
Member Party to the Rome Statue if the Security Council Refers the
Matter Pursuant to Its Chapter VII Powers
A criminal court that is unable to prosecute is not effective. 121 The
U.N. Security Council can refer the Merowe Dam situation to the
Special Prosecutor pursuant to the Council’s powers under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. 122 A referral of this type is appropriate
because Sudan will not otherwise appear before the ICC. 123 The
Security Council has referred the Darfur situation, which is occurring
within the same country, and this implies that the Security Council
could refer the Merowe Dam situation to the Special Prosecutor as
well. 124 Furthermore, the Special Prosecutor found the Darfur
situation admissible, which means the ICC could potentially find the
Merowe Dam situation to be admissible. 125 In contrast to the ad hoc
tribunals that preceded the ICC, the ICC can try ongoing or presently
occurring crimes. 126
121. See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and NonParty States, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 219, 219 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000)
(arguing that ICC jurisdiction over states not party to the Rome Statute avoids the
“dismal prospect” that the court would be unable to pursue its mandate as a result
of a lack of jurisdiction).
122. See U.N. Charter, supra note 26, art. 39 (permitting the Security Council to
intervene in instances of “any threat to the peace” or “to maintain or restore
international peace and security”); see also S.C. Res. 1593, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Resolution 1593] (setting forth
justifications for referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC Prosecutor);
Darfur Inquiry, supra note 28, at 5 (illustrating an instance in which the Security
Council found a threat to international security and chose to intervene); SCHABAS,
supra note 79, at 54-55 (underscoring that the ICC’s jurisdiction may be over
subject matter, territory, individuals, and time).
123. See SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 54-55 (indicating the appropriateness of
bringing a case before the ICC when the state cannot or will not); see also FACT
SHEET, supra note 84, para. 28 (limiting the reach of the ICC to cases where the
judicial system that should be prosecuting the crime has failed to prosecute or to
pursue a good faith effort to prosecute the crime).
124. See Resolution 1593, supra note 122, ¶ 1 (referring the situation in Darfur
to the Special Prosecutor).
125. Cf. Kirsch, supra note 67, at 545 (recognizing the reality that states will
continue to be unable or unwilling to prosecute those responsible for crimes falling
under the jurisdiction of the ICC).
126. See id. (recognizing the additional difficulties created by the ICC’s power
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3. The ICC is Likely to Find Sudan’s Actions with Respect to the
Merowe Dam Inadmissible, Despite Meeting the Requirements set
forth by Article 7 of the Rome Statute for a Crime against Humanity
The ICC is not obligated to prosecute a crime simply because it
meets the requirements for jurisdiction, and it will likely refuse to
take on this case of Sudan’s forced displacements. 127 The Special
Prosecutor and the ICC have discretion to hear or decline to hear any
case, even if the ICC has jurisdiction. 128 Admissibility maintains the
high standard of the Rome Statute by allowing the ICC to choose
which cases it hears. 129 In the Darfur situation, the ICC chose to
admit the case only after a commission found evidence of crimes

to prosecute ongoing or presently occurring crimes in the areas of investigation and
security); see also Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 11 (establishing ICC
jurisdiction for any crimes committed after the enactment of the Rome Statute,
with the implication that these crimes may be ongoing); Int’l Criminal Court,
Report of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/62/314 (Aug. 31,
2007) [hereinafter Darfur Report] (describing past practices of the ICC in
protecting witnesses and victims, including issuance of warrants under seal or
delay of proceedings until the ICC is able to guarantee the safety of all those
involved).
127. See SCHABAS, supra note 79, at 55 (explaining that the hard and fast rules
of jurisdiction and the largely discretionary rules of admissibility lead to overlap in
which the Court’s discretion stands to play a significant role).
128. See Kirsch, supra note 67, at 543 (stating explicitly that even if the ICC has
jurisdiction it may not act because it is a court of last resort, making action
inappropriate until all domestic remedies have been exhausted, and because the
matter must hold sufficient gravity to merit ICC consideration); see also SCHABAS,
supra note 79, at 55 (recognizing that the concept of admissibility of cases to the
ICC is almost purely permissive, while the rules of jurisdiction are fixed, allowing
no exceptions). See generally International Criminal Court, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/ataglance/jurisdiction_admissibility.
html (last visited Aug. 20, 2008) (recognizing that ICC jurisdiction is limited to
states that have submitted to ICC jurisdiction, crimes taking place on the territory
of states that have submitted to ICC jurisdiction, issues that have been referred to
the ICC by the U.N. Security Council, and issues occurring after July 1, 2002,
while admissibility is based on the principle of complementarity, thus limiting the
instances in which the ICC will act).
129. See Eva Golinger-Moncada, Why The Case Against Chávez Will Not Be
Heard In The Hague, VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM, Nov. 17, 2003, http://www.ven
ezuelanalysis.com/analysis/225 (underscoring the importance of maintaining high
standards of admissibility under the Rome Statute to protect the credibility of the
ICC and to prevent it from becoming a “forum of baseless complaints by
extremists”).
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more serious than displacement. 130 Seeking prosecution solely on the
grounds of forced displacement distinguishes the Merowe situation
from the Darfur situation, in which the Security Council found that
the situation posed a threat to peace and security in the region. 131

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Guiding Principle 6(2)(c)’s proportionality test presents an
inadequate means of determining the acceptability of a development
project. 132 The United Nations should develop a framework that
presents specific requirements for a project to continue. In the
absence of such guidelines, the government of Sudan should strive to
meet international standards already in place.133 If Sudan fails to do
so, the ICC should admit this case and punish those responsible for
the forced relocations.

A. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK FOR
DEFINING THE BALANCE BETWEEN NECESSITY AND HARDSHIP ON
THOSE WHOM LARGE-SCALE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DISPLACE
IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF
GUIDING PRINCIPLE 6(2)(C)
First, displaced persons should benefit directly from the displacing
project. This is consistent with the language requiring a compelling
public benefit and specifically applies the benefit to those
displaced. 134 A requirement of direct benefit would ensure that IDPs
130. See Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 115, at 3 (releasing investigation results
revealing cases of murder, torture, rape, and disappearances of civilians in Darfur
perpetrated by government forced and government supported militias).
131. See Resolution 1593, supra note 122, pmbl. & ¶ 1 (deciding that the
situation in Darfur “constitute[d] a threat to international peace and security”
meriting referral to the Special Prosecutor under the Security Council’s Chapter
VII powers).
132. Cf. OP 4.12, supra note 20, para. 2(b) (providing more guidance on what an
effective proportionality test should produce, including “sustainable development
programs, providing sufficient investment resources to enable the persons
displaced by the project to share in project benefits” and an opportunity for the
displaced to participate in the implementation of these programs).
133. See KÄLIN, supra note 20, at 13 (suggesting that adherence to the Guiding
Principles and international law is concurrent given the significant overlap between
them).
134. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(2)(c) (proscribing forced
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receive some benefit promptly. 135 In this situation, for example,
Sudan should move the approximately 60,000 displaced persons to
homes and communities that have reliable and extremely cheap
electrical power. 136 The proximity inherent in such a requirement
eliminates some of the practical hurdles to implementing such a
“direct benefit” scheme. 137
Second, the government should improve the infrastructure in the
relocation areas to provide for a net reduction in the poverty level in
those areas, in contrast to the increase in poverty created by the
relocations for the Merowe Dam project. 138 The Guiding Principles
and the ICESCR already include requirements for the adequacy of
relocation housing. 139 This is consistent with the direct benefit
scheme discussed above as well. In this case, the government of
Sudan cannot show that the substantial number of IDPs will benefit
suitably to allow the project to continue, so the project should not
continue despite a showing of benefit for the nation as a whole.140
While requiring an adequate standard of living for the displaced

relocation for development projects in the absence of a “compelling or overriding
public benefit”); see also OP 4.12, supra note 20, para. 2(b) (requiring that projects
involving relocation be sufficiently funded to provide benefits to the displaced).
135. Cf. Le Thanh Long, Vietnamese Water Resources Legislation and Legal
Regulation of Dams: Viewed Through the World Commission on Dams’ Suggested
Policy Framework, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1631, 1689 (2001) (detailing an
example from Vietnam where citizens were displaced to make way for a large
hydroelectric dam project and over twenty years later still have not received
electricity from the dam).
136. See About the Dam, supra note 50 (recognizing the main benefit of the
Dam as the production of cheap and efficient electricity).
137. See Long, supra note 135, at 1637-38 (explaining that the “traditional topdown scheme of decision-making” regarding dams and dam development fails to
recognize that dams displace individuals who are often not the direct beneficiaries
of the project).
138. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (voicing concern that at the
El Multaga relocation site, the poverty level has risen from ten percent to sixty-five
percent in under two years).
139. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 18 (guaranteeing “the right to
an adequate standard of living” for displaced persons); ICESCR, supra note 8, arts.
11, 12 (recognizing the right of all people to “an adequate standard of living” and
“the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”).
140. See FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6 (illustrating the inadequacy
of the government’s proposed compensation plan, which provides only four years’
earnings for date trees, which “can provide dates for up to 100 years,” and only
minimal compensation for vegetable gardens).
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cannot prevent governments from operating in bad faith, it would be
effective in deterring governments from attempting to displace
people in situations where supplying an adequate standard of living
is impossible. 141

B. THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN SHOULD STRIVE TO MEET
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN THE RELOCATION OF THE IDPS
THE MEROWE DAM DISPLACES
In order to comply with international law regarding appropriate
treatment of IDPs, Sudan should provide the opportunity for the
IDPS to have an adequate standard of living by allowing them to
maintain the lifestyle they had before displacement. 142 Sudan should
move the IDPs, who are mostly farmers, to areas where they are able
to continue farming. 143
Although providing appropriate accommodations for relocation
will not absolve the government of Sudan of the other violations it
has committed, it would greatly help Sudan comply with
international law. 144 Sudan should also make efforts to include the
IDPs in any future decisions about their relocation. 145

C. THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD RECOGNIZE FORCIBLE
DISPLACEMENT AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY AND SHOULD
PROSECUTE THOSE RESPONSIBLE
Forced displacement is a crime against humanity, and the ICC
should prosecute it even when the situation does not involve more
141. See id. (listing some of the inadequacies and problems of the resettlement
site of El Multaga, including poor soil quality and a sizeable portion of the land
unable to be cultivated because it is still covered with sand).
142. See NPR Interview, supra note 46 (explaining that continuity of livelihood
is a significant factor in justifying and legitimizing large development projects).
143. See OP 4.12, supra note 20, paras. 9, 11 (warning of the complexity of
relocating people with close ties to the land due to impacts on their cultural identity
and encouraging sustainable strategies for resettlement that provide specifically for
IDPs who depend on the land); see also FACT-FINDING MISSION, supra note 2, § 6
(recognizing that farmers have suffered due to the forced relocations, as their diets
and the quality of their products have deteriorated due to poor soil quality).
144. See supra Part II (discussing international law and possible violations).
145. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 7 (requiring that those whom
the government will displace participate in the planning concerning their
displacement).

GROSS_PROOFED.DOC

2008]

12/4/2008 3:55:48 PM

IMPROVEMENT WITH IMPUNITY

405

serious crimes. 146 The U.N. Security Council should choose to
prosecute in appropriate cases in order to avoid rendering forced
displacement’s status as a crime against humanity a nullity.147
Because of the existing crises in Sudan and the Security Council’s
willingness to recognize the deficiencies of the Sudanese judicial
system, 148 the Merowe Dam situation is an ideal case for the Security
Council to refer to the ICC. 149 The Merowe Dam situation will not
dilute the high standard that must be met to constitute a crime against
humanity, as it meets every qualification in the Rome Statute. 150
The ICC should admit cases when a government commits a crime
against humanity that meets the requirements of the Rome Statute—
cases such as this. 151 Specifically, the ICC should admit the case of
the Merowe Dam project because there is no other appropriate forum
and because it is not a frivolous case. 152 The Special Prosecutor
should take this case to uphold the function of the ICC as a court of
last resort. 153 The domestic courts will not prosecute the government
officials responsible for the displacements, making this an
appropriate instance for ICC intervention. 154 The ICC and the U.N.
146. Cf. Glassborow, supra note 116 (including forced displacement in charges
against a suspect in the Darfur crisis, but only in addition to crimes generally
regarded as more heinous, such as murder, rape, and torture).
147. See Christine A.E. Bakker, Comment, A Full Stop to Amnesty in Argentina:
The Simón Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1106, 1113 (2005) (discussing the duty to
prosecute arising in international law from both customary and conventional law).
148. See Darfur Inquiry, supra note 28, at 6 (illustrating the weakening of the
Sudanese judicial system resulting from significant strengthening of the executive
and the failure to adequately codify human rights norms).
149. See UNHCHR Press Release, supra note 3 (presenting evidence that the
government of Sudan is committing serious violations of civil and political rights
in the execution of the Merowe Dam project).
150. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7 (stating that a widespread
“deportation or forcible transfer of population” qualifies as a crime against
humanity).
151. See id. art. 1.
152. See Golinger-Moncada, supra note 129 (arguing that to maintain the level
of international respect it commands, the ICC can and should refuse to hear
frivolous cases or claims with no merit).
153. See Darfur Report, supra note 126, ¶ 2 (reiterating that the jurisdiction of
the ICC is complementary in nature).
154. See Resolution 1593, supra note 122 (exemplifying a proper referral to the
Special Prosecutor due to the failure of the national justice system in Sudan);
Kirsch, supra note 67, at 540 (proffering historical examples of criminal
government behavior protected by ineffective national courts).
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Security Council should use this opportunity to make the statement
that they will prosecute crimes against humanity, including forcible
displacement. 155 Consistent with the emerging notion of sovereignty
as responsibility, the international community should intervene
because Sudan is not willing to prosecute. 156

CONCLUSION
Large development projects can be acceptable bases for forced
displacements. 157 Sudan, however, is displacing those in the Merowe
Dam situation in a manner inconsistent with accepted international
guidelines. Sudan must comply with international norms and laws,
and if it does not, the Security Council should refer the situation to
the ICC for prosecution of those responsible.

155. See Nicolai, supra note 28, at 814-17 (illustrating a situation in Zimbabwe
that presents a strong argument for ICC prosecution of forced displacement as a
crime against humanity but has not been pursued by the international community);
see also Zimbabwe Slum Evictions ‘A Crime’, BBC NEWS, May 23, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6683619.stm (relating a study by two human
rights groups finding that the situation in Zimbabwe meets all the requirements of
a crime against humanity and should be tried by the ICC).
156. See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY:
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 15 (1996) (indicating that states can avoid
international intervention by fulfilling their sovereign responsibilities, and in
instances when they do not, the international community may intervene).
157. See Guiding Principles, supra note 4, princ. 6(2)(c) (allowing forced
displacements when states undertake them for development projects that serve
“compelling and overriding public interests”); see also discussion supra notes 85101 and accompanying text.

